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FOURTH AMENDMENT-EXPANDING
THE SCOPE OF AUTOMOBILE
CONSENT SEARCHES
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida v. Jimeno,I the Supreme Court held that a criminal sus-
pect's right to be free from unreasonable searches was not violated
when, after he gave a police officer permission to search his car, the
officer opened a dosed container found within the car. The major-
ity based its approval of the officer's search on the principle estab-
lished in United States v. Ross, 2 which held that a warrantless search of
an automobile based on probable cause extends to closed contain-
ers "that may conceal the object of the search."' 3 The majority thus
extended the Ross holding which pertained to searches based on
probable cause, to those searches that lacked probable cause but
instead were based solely on the suspect's general consent.4 The
majority held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated since it
was objectively reasonable for the police officer to understand that
"the scope of the suspect's consent permitted him to open [the] par-
ticular container within the automobile."
5
Conversely, the Jimeno dissent argued that dosed containers
merit a "heightened expectation of privacy" over that of the interior
of an automobile. 6 This heightened expectation, according to the
dissent, Iriiandates that a police officer wishing to examine the con-
tents of a container found during a consent search of an automobile
must obtain additional consent to search the container.7 The dis-
sent feared that a broadened scope of consent searches would allow
police officers to exploit the ignorance of citizens who might not
understand that their consent would authorize the police to "rum-
1I 11 S. Ct. 1801 (1991).
2 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
3 Id. at 825.
4 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
5 Id. at 1803.
6 Id. at 1805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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mage through [their] packages." 8 Furthermore, the dissent warned
that by the majority's reasoning, a consent search of an automobile
could arguably extend to searches of the suspect's body cavities
since a reasonable person may know that drug couriers often store
contraband on their person.9
This Note examines the evolution of the scope of consent
searches of automobiles for concealed items such as contraband and
argues that the Court reasonably extended the Ross doctrine to con-
sent searches of automobiles while still preserving the Fourth
Amendment protections against unauthorized invasions of privacy.
The Court thus correctly balanced the societal concern of maintain-
ing important and efficient law enforcement techniques against the
legitimate individualized right to privacy protection in closed con-
tainers. This Note argues, however, that while the majority's opin-
ion reached the correct outcome, it completely failed to justify the
Ross extension by analyzing the relationship between warrantless
searches based on probable cause and those based on general con-
sent. Had the majority drawn the analogy between these two con-
cepts, it could have rendered an opinion impervious to any
legitimate attacks charged by the dissent, save a renunciation of the
doctrine of stare decisis itself. As a result of its failure to draw the
necessary analogy between Ross and Jimeno, the Court rendered a
cryptic holding which is vulnerable to the dissent's criticisms and
provides limited guidance for lower courts in future litigation.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." 10 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this language as guaranteeing protection of both "[one's]
interest in retaining possession of property and [one's] interest in
maintaining personal privacy."I' In his concurring opinion in Katz
v. United States,12 Justice Harlan dissected the privacy expectation
8 Id. at 1806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
9 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
11 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
12 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the court determined that the petitioner had a justi-
fiable expectation of privacy while using a public telephone booth which was violated




underlying the Fourth Amendment protections into two basic com-
ponents: "[F]irst... a person [must] exhibit[] an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and second, [this] expectation [must] be one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' 3 Further-
more, if an individual's subjective expectation is objectively justified
under a given set of circumstances thus satisfying the first compo-
nent, the second component of societal recognition of reasonable-
ness is usually satisfied as well.' 4
When one's subjective expectation of privacy is found to be rea-
sonable, the Fourth Amendment generally imposes a strong pre-
sumption in favor of requiring a warrant for searches and seizures. 15
Thus, a large part of the Court's task in deciding Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure cases involves "making a judgment as to
the scope of the word 'unreasonable.' "16 In 1967, the Supreme
Court articulated an exclusionary approach for distinguishing be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable searches that has since become
a boiler plate principle in analyzing Fourth Amendment cases in-
volving warrantless searches. 17 This principle, espoused in Katz,
holds that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished exceptions."' 18 The scope of these well-delineated excep-
tions, including voluntary consent,' 9 must be defined in a way
consistent with the justifications that spawned them.20
By and large, the majority of the articulated exceptions to the
13 Id. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring).
14 Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 357.
16 ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 39
(1975).
17 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
18 Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted). The consent search that precipitatedJimeno is one
such exception. Other exceptions to the warrant requirement include: searches inci-
dent to a valid arrest, "emergency searches, searches of vehicles stopped in transit,
seizures under the plain view doctrine, searches and seizures in open fields, and seizures
of abandoned property." JAMES B. HADDAD ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 246-47 (3d ed.
1987).
19 Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, "[w]hile the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments limit the circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there
is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily allowing a search."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-43 (1973).
20 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) ("[t]he scope of[a] search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible") (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)); Mincey v. Ari-
zona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("warrantless searches must be 'strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation' ") (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1967)).
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warrant requirement are based upon a conclusion that under certain
circumstances, the exigencies of a situation make immediate search
and seizure without the benefit of a warrant imperative. 2' Con-
versely, in situations where exigent circumstances which might
otherwise justify forgoing a valid search warrant do not exist,22 the
Supreme Court has rejected warrantless search exceptions. 23
One exception to the warrant requirement that does not always
fall within the group of exceptions based on exigent circumstances
is the so-called consent search. The consent search plays a unique
and valuable role in law enforcement and is generally justified in
terms of its effectiveness and efficiency, rather than on the urgent
circumstances incident to its use.24 Police officers frequently rely on
consent searches in lieu of obtaining a search warrant because they
"believe that the search warrant procedure is overly technical and
time-consuming and that it has no corresponding advantages for
them or meaningful protections for the individual.- 25 Moreover, a
search grounded on consent may have an added benefit to the
searching police officer, in "that the search pursuant to consent may
often be of a somewhat broader scope than would be possible under
a search warrant," 26 provided the consenting party does not explic-
21 See e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983) (citing Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967)) (hot pursuit); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969) (protective sweep search of suspect and surrounding area incident to arrest);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (exigent circumstances); Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (consent searches).
22 For example, searches where a reasonable delay to allow sufficient time to obtain a
warrant would likely prove inconsequential. See, State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla.
1989), aft'd, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990) (warrantless search by police officers of locked suit-
case found inside impounded vehicle violated petitioner's rights under Fourth
Amendment).
23 See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (search of burned home for evi-
dence of arson required issuance of criminal search warrant); United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (search of luggage seized at time of arrest cannot be justified as
incident to that arrest if search is remote in time or place from the arrest); GM Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (warrant required where government
agents' delay in making warrantless entry into petitioner's office evidenced no exigent
circumstances).
24 Its value was illustrated by the Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
243 (1973), when it rejected the argument that "every reasonable presumption ought to
be indulged against" a finding of consent. Furthermore, the court has held that the
burden of proof which must be satisfied by the government in proving valid consent is
only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than some higher standard. United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14 (1974).
25 LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 159 (1967).
26 A consent search is "not subject to challenge simply because what was permitted
was 'a general exploratory search' beyond that any search warrant could authorize."
WAYNE LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 8.1 n.5 (1987) (quoting May v. State, 618
S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).
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itly or implicitly impose limitations on his consent. 27 Other advan-
tages to consent searches include; (1) where probable cause is
lacking and thus, there is no basis for obtaining a search warrant,
valuable evidence can be discovered where otherwise it would not,28
(2) when no evidence is found after a consent search, the police of-
ficer may quickly divert his attention elsewhere, thus minimizing the
amount of valuable time wasted on bootless endeavors, and (3) simi-
larly, the amount of time that innocent suspects are detained is
minimized.
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF CONSENT SEARCHES GENERALLY
The authorization to search an area or container based on a
party's general consent renders police action reasonable, and thus
not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.29 Although Fourth
Amendment cases arising from consent searches often turn on
whether the suspect's consent was voluntary, a related issue con-
cerning the "scope" of the consent given may also arise. A determi-
nation that consent was validly obtained by a police officer prior to a
search does not necessarily ensure that evidence unearthed in the
ensuing search will be admissible in court.30 When consent is the
basis for a warrantless search, the police must limit their search to
the authority they have been granted by the consenting party.31
Thus, any limitations imposed by the consenting party concerning
the scope of the search must be respected by the searching police
officers. 32 Specifically, a validly obtained consent search "shall not
exceed, in duration or physical scope, the limits of the consent
given." 33
The rationale underlying this limitation on the scope of consent
27 Id. at § 8.1.
28 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 ("[i]n situations where the police have some evidence
of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence").
29 Id at 219 (search based on consent is facially reasonable in spite of the absence of
either a warrant issued by a magistrate or probable cause as required by the Fourth
Amendment).
30 LAFAvE, supra note 26, at § 8.1(b).
31 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("When an
official search is properly authorized - whether by consent or by issuance of a valid
warrant - the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization").
32 People v. Torand, 622 P.2d 562, 565 (Colo. 1981) (where "the consent is confined
to certain items, the search ... must be restricted to those objects and areas which are
likely to contain the articles sought").
33 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 240.3 (1975) (the con-
senting party may narrow the scope of his authorization attending a search by withdraw-
ing it, by confining the permissible area of the search, or by limiting the duration or
intensity of the search).
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searches is a logical extension of the limitations placed on warrant
searches. Indeed, overstepping the terms of a valid consent search
is no different than exceeding the explicit parameters imposed on a
validly obtained warrant. 34 In both cases the searching police officer
has transgressed the bounds of his legal authorization and thus his
actions constitute an unlawful invasion of privacy unless there is
some other justification for the search.8 5 Regardless of whether the
limitations imposed by a consenting party are manifested explicitly
or implicitly, they must be given full effect by the searching police
officer.3 6
Police officers conducting an investigation are likely to be inter-
ested in searching a particular area, such as an automobile, and thus
will normally specify a certain place and object of their search.3 7
The suspect posed with the request to search his vehicle by an inves-
tigating officer will likely either respond with a general unqualified
consent,38 as was the case injimeno, or decline to allow any search
whatsoever.3 9 When the terms of a consent are non-specific and un-
qualified, the court must make its determination as to the lawfulness
of the search based on what an objective third party, knowing all the
facts, would understand to be the scope of the consent given.40
C. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSENT SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES
AND CLOSED CONTAINERS
Due to a unique footnote tied with the passage of the Fourth
34 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (referring to police searches
authorized by consent, the Court stated "[t]he actual conduct of the search may be pre-
cisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant").
35 See, United States v. Milian-Rodriquez, 759 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11 th Cir. 1985); Ma-
son v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971) (suspect's con-
sent to search his home for narcotics did not authorize searching police officers to read
documents found during the search).
37 See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
38 See, e.g., State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989) (suspect gave police general
consent to look inside trunk of vehicle); United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.
Cal. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant's consent authorized police
officers to search entire premises including automobiles parked at certain street ad-
dress); Lamb v. State, 516 P.2d 1405 (1973) (suspect asked by police if they could "look
around" in his home, he responded that they could look anywhere they wanted to).
39 For example, it is unlikely that a suspect facing a potential search of his automobile
by a police officer would authorize the officer to search "anywhere in the car except
underneath the right front passenger side floormat" as this would draw closer attention
to the excluded area and increase the officer's suspicion. Thus the suspect is more likely
to deny authorization for the warrantless search altogether.
40 See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2799-2801 (1990) (search by police up-
held since they reasonably believed consenting party had requisite authority to consent
to area in question, even though that belief turned out to be false).
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Amendment, automobiles have historically been exempt from the
traditional warrant requirement.4 1 The same Congress that ratified
the Fourth Amendment, also enacted a statute that precluded ships
from the warrant requirement. 42 The Court has subsequently rea-
soned that since Congress did not intend ships to fall within the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, automobiles like-
wise are not intended to receive warrant protection.43 Based on this
reasoning, the Court established the "automobile exception" in the
landmark case of Carroll v. United States,44 holding that a warrantless
search of an automobile justified by probable cause was not unrea-
sonable and thus lawful under the Fourth Amendment.45
Two rationales have been espoused by the Court to justify ex-
empting the automobile from the explicit warrant requirement
called for in the Fourth Amendment. First, society recognizes a di-
minished expectation of privacy attached to automobiles making a
warrantless search based on probable cause reasonable. 46 Second, a
delayed search of an automobile is often impractical since "the vehi-
cle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought."47 Thus, exigent circumstances sur-
rounding automobiles also weigh in favor of their exemption from
the warrant requirement.48 More recently, the Court has seemingly
41 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925).
42 Act of July 31, 1784, 1 Stat. 29, 43 et seq.
43 Indeed, after reviewing pertinent legislation passed by Congress, the Court stated:
[Tihe guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Govern-
ment, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
44 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll, police officers stopped and searched a car they
believed was transporting contraband as part of a bootlegging scheme. Id. at 136. Bas-
ing their search on probable cause, the officers tore open the upholstery of the car seats
and discovered bottles of gin and whiskey hidden therein. Id. The Court determined
that the officers' search under the circumstances was justified by probable cause, and
thus the warrantless search was not unreasonable. Id. at 162.
45 Id.
46 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). Unlike an individual's home, the nature
of an automobile is such that much of its contents is open to public view. Id. at 761.
Furthermore, automobiles are almost exclusively used for travel and thus subject to ex-
tensive government regulation. Id. The Court reasoned that these factors make the
warrantless search of an automobile less intrusive than that of more private areas. Id.
47 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
48 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 132. Addi-
tionally, if the police could seize an automobile without a warrant, but were not allowed
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disregarded this second factor as a justification for the automobile
exception and focused solely on the first justification of a diminished
expectation of privacy to exclude automobiles from the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.49
In contrast to the diminished expectation of privacy in
automobiles, and the corresponding reduced protection under the
Fourth Amendment, packages have historically received warrant
protection. 50 Indeed, in 1878 the Supreme Court specifically stated
that sealed packages can "only be opened and examined under...
warrant." 5 1 Over the last one hundred years, this principle has been
reaffirmed many times and its reasoning cited in current jurispru-
dence.52 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated explicitly in Ross that
closed containers mandate Fourth Amendment protection regard-
less of their physical characteristics. 53
Given this heightened expectation of privacy attached to pack-
ages over automobiles, the question arises as to whether general
consent to search an automobile permits the opening of closed but
unlocked containers found within the automobile. This was the cen-
tral issue facing the Supreme Court inJimeno.
III. FLORIDA V. JIMENO
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 1988, Miami police officer Frank Trujillo first ob-
served Enio Jimeno at a public telephone consulting his beeper and
making several telephone calls. 54 Officer Trujillo overheard part of
one of the conversations, which led him to suspect that Jimeno was
to conduct an immediate search, they would be forced to detain the occupants of the
vehicle until the warrant could be obtained.
49 See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1982) (inventory search of
respondent's automobile revealed narcotics, thus warrantless search was lawfully ex-
tended to include further inspection of vehicle's air vents without any showing of exi-
gent circumstances).
50 ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
51 Id. at 733.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) ("[n]o less than one who
locks the doors of his house against intruders, one who safeguards his personal posses-
sions in this manner [inside a foot locker] is due the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment Warrant Clause"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (an individual
manifests an intent to keep his belongings "preserve[d] as private" when he places them
inside a closed container).
53 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982) ("the central purpose of the
Fourth Amendment forecloses [any] distinction ... [between] a paper bag or ... locked
attach6 case").
54 Brief for Respondent at 2, Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991) (No. 90-622)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
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involved in illegal drug trafficking. 55
Immediately after the telephone conversations, Jimeno and two
other suspects drove to a nearby apartment complex and went in-
side.56 Officer Trujillo continued to survey the situation from his
vehicle.57 A few minutes later, one suspect returned to the car,
picked up a package therein, and went back inside the building.58
Shortly thereafter, all three suspects came out of the building with
the package, returned to the car, and continued driving.59
Officer Trujillo followed Jimeno's car as it left the apartment
complex and subsequently pulled the car over after he saw it make a
right turn at a red light without stopping.60 After pulling the sus-
pect's car over, Officer Trujillo told Jimeno that he had been
stopped for committing a traffic infraction. 6 1 Trujillo stated further
that he suspected Jimeno was transporting narcotics and asked per-
mission to search the car, explaining that Jimeno did not have to
consent to the search.62 Jimeno responded that "he had nothing to
hide" and gave Officer Trujillo permission to search the car.63
After the other two suspects stepped out of the car, Officer Tru-
jillo proceeded to the passenger's side of the car, opened the door
55 Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991).
56 Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 2.
57 Id.
58 Id. The "package" referred to was a brown paper bag with colored fabric wrapped
around it. Brief for United States as Arnicus Curiae at 2, Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct.
1801 (1991) (No. 90-622) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
59 Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 2. The suspects remained inside the apart-
ment building for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes before returning to the car.
Brief for United States, supra note 58, at 3. When they exited the building, Jimeno was
carrying a briefcase and the aforementioned brown paper bag. Id. As they entered the
car, Jimeno passed the brown paper bag to the suspect occupying the front passenger's
seat who placed it on the floorboard of the car at her feet. Id.
60 Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991). Based on the testimony of Officer
Trujillo, the trial court made findings of fact including that the traffic violation stop was
valid, regardless of the suspected drug trafficking. Brief for Respondent, supra note 54,
at 3.
61 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
62 Id. Specifically, Officer Trujillo said; "Sir, Mr. Jimeno, the reason I'm stopping
you - in addition to the traffic infraction, I am conducting a narcotics investigation
where I have suspicion to believe you are carrying narcotics in your car." Brief for
United States, supra note 58, at 3. Officer Trujillo then asked for permission to search
the car and explained thatJimeno did not have to consent to the search, did not have to
speak with him, and that he was free to leave at any time. Id. Officer Trujillo also told
Jimeno that if he did consent to the search, he could later tell the officers to stop the
search at any point. Id. Finally, Trujillo informedjimeno that if he did not consent to a
search, Trujillo would seek a search warrant that may or may not be issued by the judge
presented with the request. Id. at n.2.
6 3 jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
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and observed the brown paper bag on the floorboard.64 The bag
was rolled up and its contents could not be observed without open-
ing it.65 Officer Trujillo picked up the brown paper bag, opened it,
and found a kilogram of cocaine inside. 66
At trial, Jimeno filed a motion to suppress the cocaine. 67 The
Circuit Court of Dade County first determined that Jimeno had
freely consented to the search of his car.68 Secondly, the court
found that Jimeno was both advised that Officer Trujillo would be
searching for illegal drugs and that Jimeno "could have assumed
that the officer would have searched the bag."' 69 Nonetheless, the
court found that since Officer Trujillo did not specifically request
permission to open the bag and examine the contents, and that
Jimeno "never specifically consented to a search of the rolled-up
paper bag," the cocaine should be suppressed. 70 Thus, the trial
court held that absent additional specific consent to search the bag,
Jimeno's "mere consent to search the car did not carry with it spe-
cific consent to open the bag and examine its contents," and there-
fore the officer had violated Jimeno's rights under the Fourth
Amendment. 7'
The State appealed to the District Court of Appeals, arguing
that the trial judge erred in not admitting the cocaine into evi-
dence. 72 The court disagreed however, affirming the grant of the
suppression motion. 73 Quoting language from its earlier decision in
Shelton v. State,74 the court held that "consent to a general search for
narcotics does not extend to 'sealed containers within the general
area agreed to by the defendant.' "75
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a brief
opinion affirmed the lower court's decision with one justice dissent-
ing.76 The majority based its decision on its previous holding in




67 State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176 (1989).
68 Brief for Respondent, supra note 54, at 3.
69 jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
7 OJimeno, 550 So. 2d at 1176.
71 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803.
7 2 Jimeno, 550 So. 2d at 1176.
73 Id.
74 549 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review dismissed, 557 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 1990).
7 5 Jimeno, 550 So. 2d at 1176.
76 State v. Jimeno, 564 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1990).
77 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
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not extend to a closed container found inside the vehicle." s78 In
Wells, the defendant consented to a search of the trunk of his car.79
Upon inspection of the trunk compartment, the police found a
locked suitcase.80 Without seeking further consent to inspect the
contents of the suitcase, the police pryed open the lock with a
knife.8 1 Once opened, the police found a garbage bag containing a
large amount of marijuana inside.8 2 The Florida Supreme Court
suppressed the marijuana, stating that if the terms of a general con-
sent to search a vehicle do not "convey permission to break open a
locked or sealed container, it is unreasonable for the police to do so
unless the search can be justified on some other basis."8 Thus, the
court reasoned that since "locking... a container constitutes a man-
ifest denial of consent to open it," the scope of the general consent
to look in the automobile's trunk did not extend to a locked piece of
luggage found inside.8 4 Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision granting
Jimeno's motion to suppress the cocaine.8 5
The State timely filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether general consent to search a vehicle may extend to
closed containers found inside the vehicle.86
B. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
1. Majority Opinion
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,87 reversed the
Florida Supreme Court and held that under the facts of this case,
general consent to search the suspect's automobile extended be-
yond the surfaces of the car's interior and included the rolled up
paper bag lying on the floorboard.88 The Court reasoned that since
it was objectively reasonable for the police officer to understand
general consent to search for drugs as an authorization to examine
the contents of the paper bag, the suspect's rights under the Fourth
78 Jimeno, 564 So. 2d at 1084.




83 State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1989).
84 Id. at 468.
85 State v. Jimeno, 564 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1990).
86 Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1803, 1803 (1991).
87 Justices White, Blackmun, O'Conner, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souterjoined in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion.
88 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
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Amendment had not been transgressed.8 9 Thus, the suspect's mo-
tion to suppress the cocaine was ultimately denied. 90
The majority began by stating the principle that the Fourth
Amendment proscribes only those searches which are deemed un-
reasonable. 9 1 Pursuant to this parameter, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that the Supreme Court has consistently permitted consent
searches, since it is clearly "reasonable for the police to conduct a
search once they have been permitted to do so."92 The Court con-
tinued, noting that its decision in Illinois v. Rodriquez93 set the stan-
dard for measuring the scope of consent searches under the Fourth
Amendment as that of " 'objective' reasonableness - what would
the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange be-
tween the officer and the suspect?" 94 Thus, the sole issue to be re-
solved was whether Officer Trujillo acted in an objectively
reasonable manner when he construed the suspect's general con-
sent to search the vehicle to include consent to examine the con-
tents of the paper bag as well.9 5
The majority's decision hinged on its earlier holding in United
States v. Ross,9 6 which stood for the proposition that "the scope of a
search is generally defined by its expressed object."9 7 Although not
articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Jimeno, Ross clearly stated
that vehicle searches based on probable cause authorized police of-
ficers to open packages found within the vehicle which might con-
tain the object of the search.9 8 Thus, without delving into the facts
of Ross, the Court simply used its distilled principle as the founda-
tion for its holding and applied the facts of the case at bar to it.99
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1803.
92 Id.
93 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
94 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1803-04.
95 Id. at 1804.
96 456 U.S. 798 (1982). In Ross, police officers acting on information from an in-
formant, stopped a car they believed to be carrying contraband. One of the officers
opened the car's trunk and found a closed brown paper bag inside. The officer then
opened the bag and found glassine bags which contained heroin.
The Supreme Court first determined that the officer had conducted a legitimate
search based on probable cause. Furthermore, the Court stated that "a lawful search of
a fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search
may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or openings
may be required to complete the search." Based on this reasoning, the Court upheld
the lawfulness of the officer's search of both the trunk and the paper bag.
9 7 Jimeno, Ill S. Ct. at 1804.
98 Ross, 456 U.S. at 800.
9 9 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
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First, the Court noted that the terms of the consent search were
straightforward; the suspect granted Officer Trujillo unrestricted
authorization to search his car. 00 Thus, there was no evidence of
any "explicit limitation on the scope of the search."'' 1 Moreover,
the Court stressed that the police officer explicitly informed Jimeno
that he was suspected of transporting contraband and that during
the inspection of the car the officer would be looking for controlled
substances. 10 2 Given the fact that Officer Trujillo received un-
restricted authorization, under simple but specific terms, the major-
ity reasoned that "it was objectively reasonable for [Officer Trujillo]
to conclude that the general consent to search [the suspect's] car
included consent to search containers within the car that might bear
drugs." 03
The majority continued, stating that a reasonable person knows
that drugs are "generally carried in some form of a container" and
not " 'strewn across the trunk or floor of a car.' "104 Thus, the
Court concluded that the suspect's general consent to search his car
under these specific terms extended beyond the overtly visible sur-
faces of the car's interior to the rolled up paper bag lying on the
floorboard.' 05
The Court then distinguished the facts of the instant case from
those of State v. Wells,' 06 which the Florida Supreme Court had used
as the basis for its contrary decision.' 0 7 Noting that Wells involved
the consent search of a vehicle's trunk for contraband, the Court
stressed that the officer's actions in that case transcended the scope
of the authorization to search the vehicle's trunk because the police
officer broke open a locked briefcase found therein.'08 Noting that
it is objectively unreasonable to assume that an individual's consent
to search his trunk would also authorize damaging his property, the
Court stated that it was "otherwise with respect to a closed paper
bag."' 0 9 The Court's implicit reasoning was that a locked briefcase
manifests an intent to keep the contents lying within private. Thus,
this heightened expectation of privacy in a locked briefcase would





104 Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982)).
105 Id. at 1804.
106 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989).





search. The majority indicated that locked briefcases are clearly dis-
tinguishable from mere paper bags which do not manifest this
heightened expectation of privacy.'1 0
Finally, the majority addressed the respondent's contention
that police should separately request permission to search each
container if they wish to search closed containers found within the
vehicle."' The majority reasoned that since a suspect has the
power to restrict or narrow the scope of the consent search at any
time, there was no need to add this additional "superstructure to
the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness." '" 2
In conclusion, the majority further justified its holding by stat-
ing," 'the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for
the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution
and prosecution of crime, evidence that may ensure that a wholly
innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal
offense.' "113
2. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Marshall"14 dissented from the majority opinion and ar-
gued that the consent to search one's car, and the consent to search
closed containers found within the car are not one and the same. 15
Justice Marshall cautioned that construing a general consent to
search a vehicle as including containers found inside the vehicle
could, by the same logic, extend to searches of the consenting indi-
vidual's body cavities since "a reasonable person may be expected
to know that drug couriers frequently store their contraband on
their persons or in their body cavities." 116 Thus, the dissent rea-
soned that the integrity of the Fourth Amendment would be better
maintained by requiring police officers to obtain additional consent
before searching suspicious containers found inside the vehicle. 1 7
Justice Marshall began his dissent by distinguishing between
the well established expectations of privacy that attach to cars and to




113 Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973)).
114 Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall in the dissent.
115 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1806. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 1805. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
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South Dakota v. Opperman,120 Justice Marshall first noted that cars are
generally open to public view, subjected to continual governmental
control and regulation, and are not ordinarily "used as a residence
or repository for one's personal effects."' 21 He contrasted cars with
"luggage, handbags, paper bags, and other containers" that have
traditionally enjoyed a "heightened expectation of privacy."' 122
Thus, Justice Marshall argued that the act of placing items inside a
closed container clearly manifests an intention to keep those items
private and "'free from public examination.' "123 Justice Marshall
further argued that these distinct and separate expectations of pri-
vacy do not merge when one transports closed containers inside his
car. 124
Justice Marshall then criticized the majority for suggesting a
distinction between locked briefcases and paper bags as a plausible
argument for diverging from the Court's holding in Florida v.
Wells. 125 Quoting language from Ross, Justice Marshall stated that
the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a dis-
tinction. Forjust as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely
entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic man-
sion, so also may a traveller who carries a toothbrush and a few articles
of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to con-
ceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated execu-
tive with the locked attach6 case.126
Consistent with this established privacy distinction between
packages and cars, Justice Marshall reasoned that the heightened
expectation of privacy attached to closed containers mandates that
officers request additional consent before examining the contents of
closed containers.' 27 This procedural safeguard, according to Jus-
tice Marshall, would prevent police officers from exploiting the ig-
norance of citizens who might not intend their general consent to
extend to searches of packages inside their cars.' 28
Next, the dissent cautioned that by extending the scope of con-
sent searches of vehicles to include searches of any container that
might reasonably carry the object of the search, police officers may
120 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
121 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1805. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11
(1977)).
124 Id. at 1805. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822
(1982)) (footnote omitted).
127 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128 Id. at 1806. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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subject drug courier suspects to searches of their body cavities since
reasonable people know that drugs are often transported on the
drug courier's person.' 29 Furthermore, the dissent reasoned that
despite arguments to the contrary, the majority's decision would
only serve to thwart the "'community's ... interest in encouraging
consent'" because broadening the scope of consent searches would
discourage individuals from consenting.' 30 Furthermore, the dis-
sent charged that the majority's real concern was that if police of-
ficers were required to obtain additional consent before searching
closed containers found during automobile searches, "individuals
who did not mean to authorize such additional searching would
have the opportunity to say no." 13'
In conclusion, Justice Marshall reiterated his dissatisfaction
with the majority's reasoning in Schneckloth that "practical interests
in efficacious law enforcement" would be furthered by allowing an
individual to validly consent to a search without being informed of
his rights to withhold that consent.' 32 Quoting from his dissenting
opinion in Schneckloth, Justice Marshall stated that "when the Court
speaks of practicality, what it is really talking of is the continued abil-
ity of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to
accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying
only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights."' 33
Accordingly, Justice Marshall concluded that an individual's consent
to search his car should not extend authorization to a search of
closed containers inside the car.134
IV. ANALYSIS
TheJimeno Court correctly balanced the long standing govern-
mental interest of protecting individuals from unreasonable inva-
sions of privacy with the important competing interest of
maintaining the effectiveness of valid consent searches. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist based his decision inJimeno on the distilled gloss of
"objective reasonableness" espoused in Ross.135
The task of defining purely judgmental concepts such as "ob-
jective reasonableness" is a difficult one at best. In his concise two
129 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973)) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
131 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).




page opinion, the ChiefJustice opted to state simply the standard of
objective reasonableness narrowed in scope by a defined expressed
object, and then applied this standard to the pertinent facts of
Jimeno. 3 6 Although he arrived at the correct outcome, the Chief
Justice failed to bridge the logical gap between Ross and Jimeno by
not discussing the relationship of the authorization recognized
under consent searches to that recognized under probable cause
searches. Indeed, the Chief Justice failed to mention anywhere in
the opinion that Ross involved a search based on probable cause, not
a consent based search as inJimeno. As discussed below, this logical
gap in the majority's opinion leaves it vulnerable to criticisms such
as that charged in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. It will be
helpful in this analysis to set the stage for the Ross extension by re-
viewing its facts and reasoning, and the important principles that
flowed from them.
A. UNITED STATES V. ROSS
In United States v. Ross,' 3 7 the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of police authority under the "automobile exception" to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.138  Specifically, the
Court addressed the issue of the extent to which police officers
"who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have prob-
able cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere
within it may conduct a probing search of ... containers within the
vehicle whose contents are not in plain view."' 3 9 Ross established
the principle that a warrantless search of a vehicle based on prob-
able cause extends to closed containers "that may conceal the object
of the search." 140
In Ross, police officers received a tip from a reliable informant
that an individual known as "Bandit"-later identified as Albert
Ross, the defendant in this action-was selling narcotics kept in the
trunk of his car located at a specified location. 14 1 The officers
quickly located the car and suspect using detailed descriptions pro-
vided by the informant.142 Without obtaining a warrant, the officers
stopped the vehicle, told Ross to get out and proceeded to search
136 Id.
137 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
138 Id. at 800.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 825.
141 Id. at 800.
142 Id. at 801.
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the car's interior. 143 Next, one of the officers took the suspect's
keys, opened the trunk and found a closed brown paper bag in-
side.144 The officer then opened the bag and found a number of
glassine bags containing heroin inside.145
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute.' 46 Prior to trial, Ross moved to suppress the heroin on the
theory that the warrantless search of the paper bag was illegal.' 47
The district court denied the motion and Ross was convicted. 148 Af-
ter the court of appeals reversed, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found both that the
search was supported by probable cause that would justify the issu-
ance of a warrant, and that the search was lawful - including the
opening of the paper bag discovered inside the trunk. 149 The Court
supported its holding by noting that "[d]uring virtually the entire
history of our country-whether contraband was transported in a
horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it
has been assumed that a lawful search of a vehicle would include a
search of any container that might conceal the object of the
search."' 5 0 The Court further explained:
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area
in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by
the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required
to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that authorizes an officer to
search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open
closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be
found. A warrant to open a footlocker to search for marihuana would
also authorize the opening of packages found inside. A warrant to
search a vehicle would support a search of every part of the vehicle
that might contain the object of the search. When a legitimate search
is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been precisely
defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in
the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give
way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand. 15 1







149 Id. at 825.
150 Id. at 820 n.26.
151 Id. at 820-21.
790 [Vol. 82
AUTOMOBILE CONSENT SEARCHES
rizes a police officer to search the interior of an automobile for
drugs, the authorization extends to closed containers found within
the vehicle. 152 This holds true even though the probable cause may
not pertain specifically to the containers that are to be searched.' 53
One possible rationale for this rule is that any objects that are inside
the containers are also inside the car, therefore, the authority to
search the container is implicit in the authorization to search the car.
B. APPLICATION OF ROSS TO JIMENO
The main point of inquiry inJimeno, like that of Ross, was the
scope of a warrantless search concerning closed but unlocked con-
tainers found within an automobile. In contrast to Ross, however,
the warrantless search inJimeno was based on the suspect's general
consent, rather than probable cause resulting from surrounding cir-
cumstances. 154 Specifically,Jimeno addressed whether the scope of a
general consent to search one's vehicle may extend to closed con-
tainers found inside that vehicle. 155
Although the majority decidedJimeno correctly, its rather cryp-
tic reasoning is open to criticism. Most importantly, the majority's
opinion completely failed to address the important distinction be-
tween consent based searches and searches based on probable cause
in the context of automobiles. Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist ap-
pears to have made the extraordinary judicial leap from Ross to
Jimeno without any justification whatsoever. Perhaps equally per-
plexing, Marshall's dissent also failed to recognize this unbridged
gap in the majority's opinion. It is untenable that this important
distinction between Ross andJimeno was not brought out thoroughly
by either the majority or dissenting opinions since it arguably con-
trols the outcome of the case. This holds true because (1) assuming
the reasoning articulated in Ross is sound, and (2) police conduct
pursuant to probable cause searches is equivalent to police conduct
based on general consent, then it follows that (3) just as the sus-
pect's Fourth Amendment rights in Ross were not transgressed,
neither were those of the suspect injimeno. Indeed, whether one
accepts the reasoning behind Ross or not, the doctrine of stare deci-
sis mandates that Ross controlsJimeno if case law supports the anal-
ogy between consent and probable cause searches in the context of
appropriate police activity.
152 Id. at 823.
153 Id.




As stated previously in this Note, legitimate police conduct pur-
suant to a suspect's general consent is essentially analogous to that
based on probable cause. 156 Just as overstepping the terms of a
consent search is no different than exceeding the explicitly stated
parameters of a validly obtained search warrant, police conduct fall-
ing within the legally permissible parameters of consent will satisfy
those parameters of probable cause searches as well. Indeed, con-
sent and/or probable cause based searches can sometimes authorize
a more extensive search than that of a warrant. 157 For example, a
valid search warrant must specify both the place to be searched and
the items to be seized, while a suspect's consent can authorize a gen-
eral exploratory search. 158
Supreme Court jurisprudence also supports the proposition
that appropriate police conduct based on consent should be deemed
analogous to that based on probable cause. As previously noted,
Ross analogized searches based on probable cause to those based on
a validly obtained search warrant. 159 Similarly, Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamonte stated that "[t]he actual conduct of [a consent] search may
be precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant."' 60
Thus, if (1) police conduct pursuant to probable cause is analogous
to police conduct pursuant to a warrant, and (2) police conduct pur-
suant to consent is precisely the same as that pursuant to a warrant,
then it logically follows that (3) police activity authorized by prob-
able cause is analogous to that authorized by consent. In sum, the
analogous concepts of legitimate police activity pursuant to consent
based and probable cause based searches coupled with the doctrine
of stare decisis result in a formula that confirms the outcome es-
poused by theJimeno majority. 16 1
156 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
158 Id.
159 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). "The scope of a warrantless search
based on probable cause is no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search
authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of the
magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize." Id. at
823 (footnote omitted). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) Since a
validly obtained search warrant could have authorized government agents to open the
rear portion of the suspect's automobile and to rip open the upholstery in their search
for contraband, the search based on probable cause was constitutionally permissible.
160 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
161 TheJimeno outcome is also supported by lower courtjurisprudence. See e.g. United
States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 794 (11 th Cir. 1985)(consent to search suspect's car
and remove any items pertinent to the investigation authorized search of unlocked suit-
case in car, "as documents or other items ... cannot necessarily be expected to be lying
loose in an automobile"); United States v. Covello, 657 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1981)(de-
fendant's consent to complete search of car authorized search of three pieces of luggage
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It is clear from the reasoning above that the majority's decision
rendered the correct outcome in Jimeno. However, it is also clear
that the ChiefJustice could have bridged the logical gap in his argu-
ment by simply stating the facts of Ross with some specificity, and
then drawing the analogy between searches based on probable
cause and those based on consent. Having drawn this analogy, the
Chief Justice could have then easily extended the Ross reasoning to
Jimeno. Having woven the argument in this way, the Chief Justice
could have rendered an opinion virtually impervious to all legiti-
mate attacks from the dissent, save a rejection of the doctrine of
stare decisis itself.
As it stands however, the majority's argument is susceptible to
the very attack articulated by Justice Marshall. The thrust of Mar-
shall's dissent is that the majority's opinion does not provide ade-
quate protection against seemingly oppressive searches conducted
by overzealous police officers. Specifically, Marshall's concern is
that the majority's opinion puts too much discretion in the hands of
police officers who could literally search an individual's body cavi-
ties having merely obtained the suspect's general consent to search
his automobile.
Although at first blush Justice Marshall's charge appears to be
an unreasonable extension of the majority's opinion, a closer analy-
sis shows that it is not wholly without merit. As previously stated,
Chief Justice Rehnquist based his limitation on the scope of consent
searches primarily on the concept of "objective reasonableness"
limited by the search's "expressed object." 162 This standard was
narrowed further when the majority addressed its reason for over-
ruling the Florida Supreme Court's decision which was based on
State v. Wells. 163 In just three sentences the majority distinguished
Wells as a case where the search of a locked suitcase resulted in prop-
erty damage - unlikeJimeno where no damage to property resulted
from the search. 164 Thus, the majority factored property damage as
a limitation into its consent scope calculus, further curbing the
breadth of consent searches of automobiles for contraband. Unfor-
tunately, the Court opted to leave the property damage limitation to
objective reasonableness as a nebulous parameter and did not opine
on what degree of damage might overstep the unclear line of objec-
tive reasonableness. For example, if prying open a suitcase with a
in the car's trunk); State v. Austin, 581 P.2d 1288 (1978) (defendant's consent to search
his car's trunk authorized officer to open paper sack found within).
162 Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1806 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163 State v. Wells, 539 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1989).
164 Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. at 1804.
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knife as in Wells is going too far, then what about tearing off a
shrink-wrapped plastic seal on the top of a medicine bottle? Or per-
haps when removing a piece of tape from a rolled up paper bag, the
bag is inadvertently torn - would this call for upholding a suppres-
sion motion based on a Fourth Amendment violation? Although the
majority's opinion is refreshingly brief, it fails to adequately address
many of the nuances of thefimeno issue and leaves entirely too much
discretion in the hands of investigating police officers.
Most importantly, as suggested by Justice Marshall, the major-
ity's property damage limitation on the scope of consent searches
apparently legitimizes any search activity that does not result in
property damage. Since cavity searches generally entail a non-inju-
rious probing of a suspect's bodily orifices, 165 they arguably do not
result in any "property damage" as the term would be defined con-
sidering objectively viewed shared expectations of society. Thus,
based on Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, police officers are free
to strip search and perform cavity checks on all suspected drug cou-
riers who consent to have their vehicles searched.
This extension of the majority opinion is probably not what the
ChiefJustice had in mind when he articulated his objective reasona-
bleness standard. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist would likely ar-
gue that there is nothing "objectively reasonable" about
administering cavity searches based on an individual's general con-
sent to search his vehicle. Be that as it may, Justice Marshall's dis-
sent illustrates the malleability of the majority's opinion and signals
that a more precise delineation of the limits imposed on the scope of
consent searches should have been articulated.
While an in depth discussion of other possible limitations of
consent searches and their ramifications is beyond the scope of this
Note, this author acknowledges that a problem of this caliber does
not lend itself to a mere listing of limitations. Although a broad
limitation such as restraining police officers from strip searches
based on general consent altogether could be articulated by courts
in the future, administrative rules adopted by individual police sta-
tions are probably the best way to deal with this problem. Each po-
lice station could specify that officers obtaining an general consent
can go no further than a general "patdown"' 66 search of suspects
for drugs or concealed weapons, subject to certain specified limita-
165 Otherwise known as a "body search," whereby an individual's "body cavities and
hair are examined for hidden contraband and weapons." 9 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN
LAW 136 (1984).
166 Also known as a "stop and frisk" or "threshold inquiry," a patdown refers to a
police officer "run[ing] [his] hands lightly over the suspect's outer garments to deter-
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tions. Any limitations must be strictly adhered to since patdown
searches can entail an infinite set of variations of intensity depend-
ing on the particular police officer and corresponding suspect. 167
One might query what rationale could explain the majority's
brief and nebulous opinion on this important issue? This author
speculates that there are at least two reasons. First, the task of de-
lineating a bright line rule to define the scope of vehicular consent
searches may simply be impossible. 168 With a veritable plethora of
different types of containers capable of concealing contraband, the
court may have decided that this problematic issue did not lend it-
self to a rigid mechanical bright line rule. Pursuant to that reason-
ing, the court may have arrived at a second reason. By authoring a
cryptic general holding, the majority has set the stage for many
highly judgmental rulings by lower courts that are clearly in the best
position to embrace all of the pertinent facts and render more ap-
propriate decisions in specific case scenarios.
Whatever the reasoning for its brevity, the above analysis shows
that the Court reached a reasonable conclusion by extending the
well grounded principles espoused in Ross to warrantless searches
based on consent. Lower courts, however, should bear in mind that
broadening the scope of permissible police activities at the expense
of Fourth Amendment protections must always warrant detailed
analyses and substantial justifications.
V. CONCLUSION
The fimeno Court addressed an important issue foreshadowed
by Ross. This issue required a balancing of individuals' privacy in-
terests in automobiles and closed containers with maintaining the
integrity of consent searches as an effective law enforcement tech-
nique. The Jimeno majority chose to apply the standard of "objec-
tive reasonableness" in analyzing the scope of searches for narcotics
in automobiles based on the suspect's general consent. 69 The
Court was forced to choose between the two competing precedents
mine if the person is carrying a concealed weapon." BLACK'S LAW DCTONARY 1420 (6th
ed. 1991).
167 However, the patdown search is generally "intended to stop short of any activity
that could be considered a violation of Fourth Amendment rights." Id.
168 See, e.g. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982). Referring to situations
where police officers have probable cause to believe individuals driving a stopped vehi-
cle may be transporting contraband, the Court stated, "[i]n every such case a conflict is
presented between the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the
public interest in effective law enforcement. No single rule of law can resolve every
conflict .. "
169 See Florida v.Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1804 (1991).
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established in Ross and Wells. An extension of either holding neces-
sarily would limit severely the holding of the other. The majority's
decision to extend Ross from searches based on probable cause to
those based on consent, will have far reaching ramifications. These
ramifications will further current public policy of thwarting drug
trafficking activities by allowing police officers to capitalize on con-
sent searches. Yet this outcome still preserves the integrity of the
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless invasions of pri-
vacy. Had the Court come to the contrary decision espoused by the
dissent, a decision which would limit consent searches only to ex-
posed surfaces of the interior of vehicles, general consent would
have been rendered a hollow, meaningless concept.
GEORGE S. LOCHHEAD
